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ABSTRACT
Organizational networks are vulnerable to traffic-analysis
attacks that enable adversaries to infer sensitive information
from network traffic — even if encryption is used.
We present PriFi, an anonymous communication protocol for
LANs which provides identity protection and provable tracking-
resistance against eavesdroppers; it has low latency and is
application agnostic. PriFi builds on Dining Cryptographers
networks (DC-nets) and solves several of their limitations.
For instance, the communication latency is reduced via a
client/relay/server architecture tailored to LANs, where a set of
servers assist the anonymization process without adding latency.
Unlike mix networks and other DC-nets systems, a client’s
packets remain on their usual network path without additional
hops. Moreover, PriFi protects clients against equivocation
attacks without adding significant latency overhead and without
requiring communication among clients. PriFi also detects
disruption (jamming) attacks without costly consensus among
servers. We evaluate PriFi, and results show that PriFi intro-
duces a small latency overhead (≈120ms for 100 clients) and
is compatible with delay-sensitive applications such as VoIP.
I. INTRODUCTION
Local area networks (LANs) deployed in organizational net-
works are vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks. Many organiza-
tional networks use Wireless LANs, upon which eavesdropping
is easy for insiders and outsiders [25, 60, 1, 5]. Even in Ethernet
networks1, a well-positioned eavesdropper can easily observe
some or all traffic [24]. Sensitive traffic is usually encrypted at
the link- or transport-level (e.g., with IEEE 802.11 or TLS), but
some metadata such as who is communicating remains visible.
This enables an eavesdropper to passively identify and track
users [28, 73], and potentially perform targeted attacks on spe-
cific devices and users (e.g., on high-value individuals). A single
compromised device can perform such an attack, and so do
curious, malicious or coerced users and system administrators.
To protect against targeted eavesdropping in LANs, few
solutions exist. Standard encryption protocols (e.g., TLS,
VPNs, IPsec) do not hide the identity of the communicating
entities [55, 37, 36]. VLANs isolate users but do not hide the
traffic patterns on wireless channels, which remains visible even
when the network infrastructure is not compromised, e.g., in the
1An LAN network partitioned with switches, where traffic is typically not
broadcasted.
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Fig. 1. PriFi’s architecture consists of clients, a relay, and group of anytrust
servers called the guards. Clients’ packets remain on their usual network path
without additional hops, unlike in mix-networks and onion-routing protocols.
case of a parking-lot attack2. In both cases, an attacker can use
traffic-analysis attacks to passively track individuals and infer
communication’s contents (e.g., identifying endpoints such as
websites [67, 7, 35, 50], contents such as videos streams [26,
57], or English Words in encrypted Skype calls [8, 68]).
Anonymous communication networks (ACNs) are tools
designed to conceal the communicating entities; however, most
ACNs are typically designed for the Internet and translate
poorly to the LAN setting. Most ACNs rely on mix-networks
or onion-routing, and a common drawback is that their security
relies on routing the traffic through a set of servers on the
Internet [23, 53, 11, 12, 42]. First, this implies that in the
context of an organization, traffic whose destination is the local
organizational services needs to be routed over the Internet
before coming back to the organization. More importantly, to
minimize the risks of coercion and collusion, those servers
are typically spread across different jurisdictions, and hence
those designs introduce an important latency overhead.
Dining-Cryptographer’s networks (DC-nets) [9] are an
anonymization primitive which is attractive latency-wise, since
their security relies on information coding and not on sequential
operations done by different servers, and anonymity can in
theory be achieved without costly server-to-server communica-
tion. This theoretical appeal has not been achieved in practice
however, and previous DC-net systems such as Dissent [14],
Dissent in Numbers [71], and Verdict [15] still use costly server-
to-server communication, achieving latencies in the order of sec-
onds [71], and notably route user’s traffic through the servers.
2Attacking or eavesdropping on a Wireless network from the parking lot
outside a company building, e.g., using specialized antennas.
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2We present PriFi, the first low-latency anonymous
communication network tailored to organizational networks.
PriFi provides identities protection and tracking resistance
against internal and external eavesdroppers; users connected
to PriFi are assured that their communications are
indistinguishable from the communications of other
PriFi users. PriFi works at the network-level — like a VPN —
using DC-nets to anonymize IP packet flows. Unlike a VPN,
the PriFi server inside the organization is not trusted, and
users remain protected in case of compromise. PriFi provides
low-latency, traffic-agnostic communication (i.e., suitable for
delay-sensitive applications such as streaming and VoIP) at
the cost of a reasonably higher bandwidth usage.
PriFi uses DC-nets in a new three-tier architecture
composed of clients and a relay (e.g., a router) in a LAN, and
guards, servers that are possibly geographically distributed
in the Internet (Figure 1). Not only is this architecture
compatible with organizational networks, but it also enables
PriFi to avoid a major latency overhead often present in
other ACNs. Unlike previous DC-nets systems, which use
multi-hop, multi-round protocols and costly server-to-server
communications [14, 71, 15], PriFi achieves significantly
lower latency by removing unnecessary communication hops
while providing similar guarantees. A notable difference is
that the traffic from clients remains on its usual network path
Client↔Router↔Internet and does not go through the guards.
Practical anonymity systems face two notable challenges:
first, in ACNs with receiver anonymity, a malicious relay can
perform equivocation attacks, i.e., de-anonymization by sending
different information to different clients and by analyzing their
subsequent behavior. Equivocation attacks can be detected by
having clients gossip on the received information, but this intro-
duces high communication costs. Previous DC-net systems did
not address this issue [14, 71, 15]. PriFi solves this by encrypt-
ing the upstream traffic with the history of downstream mes-
sages; this does not require any client-to-client communication
and adds little latency. Second, DC-net systems are notably sus-
ceptible to disruption attacks (e.g., jamming) by malicious in-
siders [9]. In similar systems, the detection of disruption attacks
requires many server-to-server communications to identify dis-
ruptors [71, 15], and this process takes up to hours [71]. In PriFi,
we leverage on the special role of the relay in our topology to
perform this detection much faster (in seconds); in particular,
the detection is done with no added latency and without commu-
nication with the servers, via a probabilistic trap-bit mechanism.
As a potential use-case, we explore PriFi in the context
of the needs of the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC). The ICRC is interested in PriFi notably
because of their strong privacy and security needs regarding
communications; researchers previously identified a need for
traffic-analysis-resistant networks with sufficiently low latency
and high bandwidth for conducting field work with acceptable
overhead [46]. The same study also confirms that “staffs and
beneficiaries need to communicate in a multitude of adverse
environments that are often susceptible to eavesdropping,
physical attacks on the infrastructure, and to coercion of the
personnel”, and some delegation grant IT administrative access
only to regional staff “to minimize insider threats” [46]. One
part of our evaluation is dedicated to this use-case.
We implemented a prototype of PriFi on desktop, iOS
and Android devices, and we evaluate its performance on
the Deterlab [22] infrastructure using (a) public standard
datasets and (b) a private ICRC dataset. We observe that the
latency overhead caused by PriFi is low enough for VoIP and
video conferencing (≈120 ms for 100 users), and the internal
and external bandwidth usage of PriFi is acceptable in an
organizational network. In comparison, the latency of the closest
related work, Dissent in Numbers [71], is 14.5 seconds for 100
clients when deployed on the same setup. We explore multiple
scenarios; one where all clients are part of the same (W)LAN
(corresponding to one building or facility), one where clients
use PriFi as a remote VPN, benefiting from the organization’s
protection while roaming, and another where the organization
leverages a local trusted server (which is the case in some
ICRC delegations). Having a local trusted server reduces
latency up to 50%, whereas the latency in the VPN scenario is
around 500 ms for 100 clients. Finally, we show that despite
the synchronous nature of DC-nets, user mobility does not
jeopardize the high availability (99.82%) of the PriFi network.
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
• PriFi, a low-latency, traffic-analysis-resistant anonymous
communication with sufficient scalability to support current
organizational networks;
• Novel low-latency protections against equivocation attacks
by compromised relays and disruption attacks by malicious
clients;
• An open-source implementation of PriFi in Go on desktop
computers, and Android and iOS applications [2].
II. BACKGROUND & DC-NET CHALLENGES
A Dining Cryptographers network [9] is a multiparty
protocol that enables users to anonymously send and receive
information. Users first exchange shared secrets; then, each
round, all users broadcast ciphertexts, and only one of them
sends an anonymous message. By XORing all ciphertexts,
any party can compute the plaintext message. This protocol
achieves unconditional sender- and receiver-anonymity and
has been used as a basis for several ACNs [71, 15].
We now describe the key challenges of DC-nets-based ACNs.
Impact of Topology. The initial DC-nets design [9] requires
key material between every pair of members. Dissent [71] and
subsequent work [15] have a more scalable two-tier topology
made of clients and servers, where each client only exchanges
a secret with each server. However, the client/server topology
has a significant negative impact on latency: it requires several
server-to-server rounds of communication to ensure integrity,
accountability, and to handle client churn. PriFi avoids this
drawback with a new client/relay/guard architecture.
Disruption Protection. Vanilla DC-nets are vulnerable to
disruption attacks (i.e., jamming) [9] from malicious insiders:
e.g., an malicious user can corrupt other clients’ plaintexts.
Previous work used proactively verifiable constructions [14, 15]
that are incompatible with low-latency communication, or
3blame mechanisms [70] requiring minutes to hours to find
disruptors. PriFi uses a new probabilistic mechanism to
retroactively blame users and to detect disruptors in seconds.
Equivocation Protection. Previous DC-net systems did not
address equivocation attacks (i.e., feeding each client different,
identifiable information to distinguish the anonymous receiver;
see Section VI), which are nonetheless a practical and covert
attack against these systems [14, 71, 15]. Some standard
protections are gossiping or running consensus among clients;
however, not only they are costly in terms of bandwidth, but
also they introduce latency, as clients cannot use any received
information before the results of the gossiping/consensus.
In PriFi, messages from clients cannot be decrypted if an
equivocation attack happened, and PriFi protects against the
threat without added latency or communication among clients.
Churn. A major challenge for DC-nets is to handle churn, i.e.,
clients joining or leaving the network, because it invalidates
the current communication and requires a new exchange of
keys. PriFi uses small and frequent communication rounds
to maintain high availability in presence of churn.
Scheduling. A DC-nets creates an anonymous channel
shared among its clients; this channel is prone to collisions
when two clients communicate at the same time. Previous
works [14, 71, 15] use a scheduling mechanism to organize
clients in time slots, as PriFi does.
III. PRIFI SYSTEM OVERVIEW
PriFi can be considered as a low-latency proxy service
(e.g., a VPN or SOCKS tunnel) working within a LAN,
creating tunnels between clients and the PriFi relay (e.g.,
the LAN’s router). Informally, those tunnels protect honest
client’s traffic from eavesdropping attacks. The traffic is
anonymized, preventing a third-party to assign a packet or
flow to a specific device or end-user. Additionally, unlike
traditional proxy services, (1) the server does not need to be
trusted, i.e., it can attempt to de-anonymize the clients, and (2)
the communications provably resists traffic-analysis attacks.
A. System Model
Consider n clients C1,...,Cn, at least two of which are honest.
The clients are part of an organizational network (i.e., a LAN)
and are connected to a relay R. The relay is the gateway that
connects the LAN to the Internet (e.g., a LAN or WLAN router,
Figure 1) and typically is already part of the existing infras-
tructure. The relay is trusted for availability (see Section III-C)
but not for anonymity or privacy. The relay can process regular
network traffic in addition to running the PriFi software; hence,
PriFi can be added to a network with minimal changes.
In the Internet, there is a small set of m servers called guards
S1,...,Sm, whose role is to assist the relay in the anonymization
process. The clients trust that at least one guard is honest and
uncompromised (anytrust model — see Section III-C). These
guards could be maintained by independent third parties, similar
to Tor’s volunteer relays, or sold as a “privacy service” by com-
panies. To maximize diversity and collective trustworthiness,
these guards are distributed around the world, preferably across
different jurisdictions. Therefore, the connections between the
guards and the relay are assumed to be high latency.
B. Goals
1) Security Goal
• Anonymity: An adversary should not be able to attribute
an honest PriFi user’s message to its author with a
probability significantly higher than random guessing.
This includes traffic-analysis resistance, i.e., the adversary
can use metadata (e.g., network-level traffic features) to
de-anonymize traffic.
2) System Goals
• Low latency: The delay introduced by PriFi should be
small enough to support network applications with different
QoS requirements, e.g., e-mail, instant messaging, web
browsing, VoIP and videoconferencing.
• Scalability: PriFi should support small to medium
organizations (i.e., up to a few hundred users, a number
typically observed in ICRC operational sites).
• Accountability: Misbehaving parties are traceable without
affecting the anonymity of honest users, and with a moderate
performance impact.
3) Non-goals
PriFi does not target the following goals:
• Hiding all traffic features: PriFi does not hide global
communication volumes or time-series of packets. PriFi
focuses on protecting one honest user’s traffic among all
honest users’ traffic. The aggregate traffic statistics (e.g.,
volumes, timings) are not protected. Regardless, this point
is fairly orthogonal to the design of PriFi, and can be
addressed by adding padding and/or dummy traffic, as
proposed by many related work [72, 47, 69, 66, 27].
• External sender/receiver anonymity: PriFi’s anonymity set
consists of the set of users connected to a LAN. Senders
and receivers outside the LAN are not anonymous. If both
sender and receiver are part of a PriFi LAN (not necessarily
the same), the protocol has sender and receiver anonymity.
• Intersection attacks (correlating users’ presence on the PriFi
network with messages or other users). In the context of
an organization, desktop computers would be connected
to PriFi most of the time, making this attack harder. A
straightforward first step is to use anonymous authentication
for the clients, e.g., DAGA [61].
C. Threat Model
We consider a global passive adversary. Additionally,
since PriFi is closed-membership, we will address active
attacks from insiders (Section V), but not active attacks from
outsiders. Some clients can be controlled by the adversary, but
we require at least two honest clients at all time (otherwise,
de-anonymization is trivial); we note that in practice in an
organization, desktop computers would be connected to PriFi
most of the time, hence the scenario of having only two
honest clients should be rare. The guards are in the anytrust
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the phases Setup and Anonymize. One Anonymize
phase correspond to a slot, which is assigned to one client, the slot owner
(here for n=3 clients A, B, and C). A schedule consists of n ordered slots.
A schedule repeats itself until the end of the epoch.
model [14, 71, 64]: at least one guard is honest (but a client does
not need to know which one), and they are all highly available.
The relay is considered malicious, i.e., it might actively try
to de-anonymize honest users or perform arbitrary attacks, with
one notable exception: It will not perform actions that affect
the availability of PriFi communications such as delaying,
corrupting or dropping messages if this only results in a
denial-of-service. In our scenario, the relay is the gateway that
connects the LAN to the Internet, and it can degrade or deny
service for any protocol anyway (e.g., drop all packets). PriFi
does not make the situation any different. In practice, this model
is not extremely interesting, since a relay performing a DoS
would be noticeable and handled administratively. Hence, we
need the relay to faithfully forward traffic and provide service.
However, we do consider that it can try to break PriFi’s security
property (i.e., de-anonymizing clients) via active attacks,
e.g., in the case of a relay infected by malware, or a relay
controlled by a malicious or coerced insider. In conclusion,
we define the relay as malicious, but trusted for availability.
IV. BASIC PRIFI PROTOCOL
A. Overview
PriFi starts with a Setup phase, followed by several
Anonymize phases (Figure 2).
In the Setup phase, clients authenticate themselves to the
relay, clients and guards derive shared secrets, and clients are
organized in a secret permutation (a schedule) to decide when
each client communicates.
Clients communicate during the Anonymize phases. In one
Anonymize phase, exactly one client can send one or several
anonymous messages. Anonymize phases are repeated so
that each client can communicate. The protocol proceeds in
time slots, and the client allowed to transmit in a given slot
is called the slot owner. A schedule consists of n time slots;
hence, each client has exactly one opportunity to transmit
during a schedule. When the n slots have passed, the schedule
is simply repeated, giving another opportunity to the clients
to communicate.
More precisely, in one Anonymize phase, PriFi anonymizes
the message(s) sent by a client using a DC-net protocol [9].
In short, all clients send ciphertexts to the relay, which then
“decrypts” the anonymous message(s); this reveals one or more
IP packets. The relay put its own IP address in the anonymous
packet (as in a NAT) and forwards it to its destination.
When receiving an answer, the relay simply encrypts it under
the (anonymous) sender’s key, and broadcasts the resulting
ciphertext to all clients. This achieves unconditional sender-
and receiver- anonymity.
B. Preliminaries
Let λ be a standard security parameter. Let G be a cyclic
finite group of prime order generated by the group element
g where the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is
hard to solve (e.g., an elliptic curve or an integer group). Let
KeyGen(G,λ) :x $←{0,...,|G|},X← gx be an algorithm that
generates the private-public key pair (x,X) usable for signing
(e.g., on ED25519).
Let Π1 = (Enc,Dec) be a ind-cpa-secure public-key
encryption scheme (PKE) [16] where c ← Enc(X,m) and
m ← Dec(x, c) are encryption and decryption algorithms
respectively, given a private-public key pair (x,X) ∈ G2, a
message m∈{0,1}∗, and a ciphertext c.
Let Π2 = (Sign, Verif) be a signature scheme where
sig←Sign(x,m) and Verif(X,m,sig) are signing and verifying
algorithms respectively, given a private-public key pair
(x,X)∈G2 and a message m∈{0,1}∗.
Let KDF :G(1λ)→{0,1}λ be a key derivation function [40]
that converts a group element into a bit string; let
PRG : {0,1}λ→ {0,1}` be a pseudo-random generator, with
` being a message length fixed in advance.
Identities. We denote the long-term key-pair of a client Ci
as (pCi ,PCi)←KeyGen(G,1λ), and as (pSj ,PSj ) for a guard
server Sj . We assume that the correct public keys are known
to all entities (e.g., via a public-key infrastucture).
C. Protocol
Setup Phase. In this phase, each client Ci authenticates itself to
the relay using its long-term public key PCi . Then, each client
Ci runs an authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol
with each guard Sj , using fresh pseudonyms, to agree on a
shared secret rij ∈{0,1}`, that is known to only both of them.
This secret is used later to compute the DC-net’s ciphertexts.
Then, clients produces a schedule pi of length n, composed
of fresh ephemeral keys corresponding to the clients. The
schedule is used to determine the slot owner on each
Anonymize phase. This binding must remain secret, otherwise
there would be no anonymity.
First, each client generates an ephemeral public/private key
pair (pˆCi ,PˆCi)←KeyGen(G,λ). The relay collects the public
keys {PˆCi} and sends them to the first guard. Second, all
the guards sequentially shuffle {PˆCi} by using a verifiable
shuffle protocol [48], each one sending its result and proof
to the next guard. At the end, the last guard sends to the
relay the final permutation pi consisting of fresh pseudonyms
{P˜Ci} unlinkable to {PˆCi}, along with the m signatures of
the shuffle. The relay sends pi={PˆCi} and the signatures to
the clients. Each client verifies (1) that there are enough users,
(2) that they can find a slot that corresponds to their secret
key, and (3) that pi is signed by at least one guard they trust.
We emphasize that a client can recognize its own slot in
pi by using its private key pˆCi , but if at least one guard is
5Protocol 1 Setup
Inputs: λ,G
Output: Each client Ci holds a copy of the schedule pi, and there is
a secret rij shared between each pair of client/guard (Ci, Sj).
1. Authentication. Each client Ci generates a fresh key pair
(pˆCi , PˆCi) ← KeyGen(G, 1λ), and sends to the R the message
PCi ||Sig(pCi ,PˆCi). Then, R checks PCi against a roster of valid
users, verifies the signature, and stores PˆCi .
2. Verifiable Shuffle. When it has collected two or more ephemeral
keys, R starts a Verifiable Shuffle [48] of the ephemeral keys {PˆCi}
with the guards S1,...,Sm, summarized here as follows:
a. R sends all ephemeral keys {PˆCi} to the first guard S1 with
the base point g.
b. S1 picks a blinding factor b∈G, computes a new base point
b·g, blinds all keys with b, shuffles their positions, and sends
the shuffled keys and the new base point g′=b·g to R.
c. R continues with the second guard S2, sending him the shuffled
keys and new base point g′, until all have participated. Then,
the relays holds a set of blinded and shuffled keys pi={P˜Ci}
— which we call the schedule — with a new base point gˆ.
d. R broadcasts to all guards S1,...,Sm a transcript of the whole
shuffle (containing all public inputs and outputs for each guard).
Each guard Sj checks that its shuffle is correctly included in the
transcript. If so, it answers with sigj = Sig(pi||gˆ), a signature
over the schedule and last base point. R collects m signatures.
3. Schedule Announcement. R broadcasts to all clients C1,...,Cn a
message pi||gˆ||sig1||...||sigj . Each client verifies all signatures, and in
particular checks that the shuffle is signed by at least one guard it trusts.
Then, each client can recognize its position in the schedule pi={P˜Ci}
by recomputing and locating the blinded public key gˆ ·pˆCi = P˜Ci .
4. Shared secrets derivation.
Each guard Sj derives a shared secret rij←pSj ·PˆCi for 1≤ i<n.
Similary, each client derive rij← pˆCi ·PSj for 1≤j<m.
honest, no one can link a position in {P˜Ci} to a position in
{PˆCi} without the appropriate private key. The Setup phase
is described in Protocol 1.
Anonymize Phase. After the Setup phase, all nodes
continuously run the Anonymize protocol (see Protocol 2).
This protocol occurs in rounds; one round (or instance) of the
Anonymize protocol corresponds to one slot in the schedule
(Figure 2). One round of Anonymize consists in exactly one
client sending one or more anonymous upstream messages (up
to a total length l) and one or more downstream message (up
to a total length l′). When the round is finished, the protocol
repeats itself with another round, until the end of the epoch.
In each round, clients and guards participate in a DC-net
protocol [9]. All guards compute one ciphertext and send it to
the relay. Each guard ciphertext is an XOR of n pseudorandom
`-bit pads generated using PRG seeded with the shared secret
rij of each client. Likewise, each client computes an `-bit
ciphertext, computed as the XOR of m pads, and sends it to
the relay. The client owning the slot creates a slightly different
ciphertext: In addition to XORing the m pads, the slot owner
also XORs its `-bit upstream message x. In practice, x is
an IP packet without source address. If the slot owner has
nothing to transmit, it sets x=0`.
Once the relay receives the m + n ciphertexts from all
clients and guards, it XORs them together to obtain y. If the
Protocol 2 Anonymize phase, round t
Inputs: t,{rij}, pi, xi, `, `′
t is the slot/round number, rij is the shared secret known only to
(Ci,Sj), pi is the shuffle shared among all clients, ` is the bit-length
of the anonymous upstream message, `′ is the bit-length of the
downstream message.
Output: Anonymous upstream message y, downstream message z.
1. Guard Ciphertext Generation. Each guard Sj computes an `-bit
pseudorandom pad pij for each client Ci using PRG seeded with rij .
Sj then computes its ciphertext sj as
sj←p1j⊕···⊕pnj
and sends it to R.
2. Client Ciphertext Generation. Each client Ci performs the
following steps:
a. Generate a `-bit pseudorandom pad pij for each guard Sj
using PRG seeded with rij
b. Compute and send a ciphertext ci to R such that
• if t mod n=pi(i) (i.e., Ci is the slot owner), then
ci←xi⊕pi1⊕···⊕pim
• Otherwise,
ci←pi1⊕···⊕pim
3. Plaintext Reveal. R collects the ciphertexts s1,...,sm and
c1,...,cfn, and computes
y←s1⊕···⊕sm ⊕ c1⊕···⊕cn
y is a IP packet with no source information. R either buffers it, or
sends it to its destination.
4. Message Broadcast. R broadcasts a downstream message z to
each Ci. If R has no data for any client, z is a 1-bit message.
protocol is executed correctly, y should be equal to x, as all
pads are included exactly twice. If y is a full IP packet, the
relay replaces the null source IP in the header by its own —
just like in a NAT — and forwards it to its Internet destination.
If it is a partial packet, the relay buffers it and completes it
during the next schedule.
At this point, the relay has computed exactly one upstream
message y, and either sent it to its destination or buffered it. To
complete the current round of the Anonymize phase, the relay
broadcasts one downstream message z to all clients, z being
whatever data the relay needs to send to the clients: either an
immediate answer to y, or an answer to a previous upstream
message. The relay uses UDP broadcast rather than n unicast
sending, letting layer-2 network equipment (e.g., switches)
replicate the message if needed; in WLANs, the broadcast is
achieved in only one message, achieving receiver anonymity at
no cost. Broadcasted messages are encrypted with the pseudony-
mous ephemeral public key in the shuffle; only the intended
client can decrypt it, and the relay does not know for who he en-
crypts. We note that z is of arbitrary length, can contain several
IP packets and, in particular, can be much larger than y, easily
accommodating downstream-intensive scenarios; finally, the
downstream traffic is not necessarily addressed to the slot owner,
and in particular the relay can send data to multiple users.
6D. Properties achieved
Security property. Informally, upstream messages are unlink-
able to clients due to the DC-net, which provides unconditional
sender-anonymity in this threat model [9]. Downstream mes-
sage achieve perfect receiver-anonymity since they are broad-
casted to all clients. We present a security proof in Appendix A.
System properties. We will present the performance of the
overall system in the Evaluation (Section VII).
E. Practical Considerations
Guards Latency. To reduce the risk of coercion by authorities,
the guards should ideally be located in various jurisdictions;
this implies large latencies between them and the relay (e.g.,
100ms). In other systems (e.g., Tor [23], mix networks and other
DC-net systems [14, 71]), client’s traffic goes through several
of these guards, which introduces a major latency bottleneck. In
PriFi, instead of transferring ciphertexts on the LAN→Internet
link, ciphertexts are streamed on the Internet→LAN link from
the guards to the relay, where it is combined with the client’s
ciphertexts to produce the anonymous output. In asymmetric
scenarios where upstream bandwidth is more scarce than
downstream bandwidth — which is typically the case [59]
— PriFi is better suited than current alternatives to protect
identities against eavesdropping within organizations.
Communication Latency. Despite the presence of high-latency
links between the guards and the relay, the duration of
an Anonymize round is mostly independent from latency
between the guards and the relay. The guards’ ciphertexts are
independent from the communicated content; hence, guards
can compute and send ciphertexts ahead of time, well before
they are needed by the relay. Ciphertexts are buffered by the
relay until the moment they are needed by an Anonymize
round. This approach also reduces the effect of the jitter on
the network path between the guards and the relay. In terms of
storage, the relay does not buffer the m guard ciphertexts for
each future round, but XORs them in advance, only storing
one `-bit ciphertext per round.
End-to-End Confidentiality. A malicious relay — or an
eavesdropper who collects all ciphertexts — can see the
upstream message plaintexts. This is also the case in a normal
LAN, and clients should use traditional end-to-end encryption
(e.g., TLS) on top of PriFi for their communications.
Multiplexing. The Anonymize phase create one anonymous
channel shared between all users and their applications. Hence,
connections need to be multiplexed over the single channel.
In our implementation, clients assign a random connection
identifier to each upstream message. This incidentally allows
the relay to maintain a buffer per connection, handling partial
messages. Additionally, the relay keeps the shuffled ephemeral
public key of the slot in which the connection was opened,
enabling him to encrypt downstream traffic for this user
(without knowing who he or she is).
As a result, messages from the same user/application can be
grouped by the adversary. However, this was already the case,
since the relay — performing NAT operations — sees the TCP
streams; we only made this information explicit in the packet.
Churn. In the case of churn, e.g., if any client or guard joins
or disconnects, the relay broadcasts a Setup request to all
nodes, which signals the start of a new epoch. Upon reception,
each node finishes the current Anonymize round and re-runs
the Setup phase. Churn can negatively affect performance; we
evaluate its effect in Section VII-E.
Load tuning. To reduce bandwidth usage, the relay periodically
sends a “load request” in which clients can open or close
their slots. The relay skips a closed slot, saving time and
bandwidth. If all slots are closed, the relay sleeps for a
predetermined interval. The concrete parameters of this
improvement (e.g., frequency of the load requests, sleep time)
are not fully explored in this work; they exhibit a classical
latency-bandwidth usage tradeoff.
F. Limitations
The protocol presented has two major limitations: (1)
in Anonymize, an active malicious insider can disrupt or
modify communications by transmitting a well-chosen value
instead of the ciphertexts ci and sj (we note that this is a
well-known issue in DC-nets); (2) the malicious relay can
break receiver-anonymity by sending different information to
different clients (an equivocation attack). We address those
issues in Sections V and VI, respectively.
V. DISRUPTION PROTECTION
In the previous protocol (and in the original DC-net design),
a malicious active insider can modify or jam upstream
communications by transmitting well-chosen bits instead of
the ciphertext defined by the protocol. This is particularly
problematic since the attacker is provably anonymous and
hence untraceable. In the related work, these attacks are
detected using trap protocols [9] or costly shuffles before
every DC-net round [14], or by transmitting accusations [71].
Those solutions require several exchanges between servers
even to identify the presence of a disruptor, which adds latency.
Leveraging the special role of the relay, PriFi detects disruption
attacks without additional messages, and can probabilistically
exclude a disruptor in seconds, orders of magnitude faster
than the related work [71] (Appendix, Figure 10)
A. Overview
Informally, to protect against disruption, the relay is honest.
A disruption-attack is just another elaborate attack degrading
availability of the network, and we already discussed how the
relay can achieve this goal anyway, with much simpler attacks
(e.g., by dropping all messages). We excluded this scenario
of our threat model: the relay honestly provides service and
maintains availability. In the setting of disruption attack, we
give the additional task for the relay to detect other disruptors
on the network; intuitively, we give a protocol for the relay
to detect insiders who perform attacks against availability; not
7running this protocol truthfully has the same effect as running
the attack himself, which is ruled out by the threat model.
Attack Detection. At the end of the Schedule phase, the relay
generates a secret riR per slot in the schedule (corresponding
to one secret per client). Then, he encrypts each secret with
the shuffled key in pi, and broadcast all encrypted secrets to the
clients. We note that the relay does not know which client own
which secret, only which pseudonym in the schedule does.
In each Anonymize phase, the slot owner computes a
HMAC with the secret riR and its upstream message x, and
sends HMAC(riR,x)||x to the relay, which can then recompute
the HMAC. If the validation fails, the relay indicates in the
downstream message to retransmit. The slot owner then tries
(in his next slot) to retransmit the message, eventually using
error-correction coding, the goal being that the relay gets at
some point the original message. To be absolutely certain
that the message is not disrupted again, the relay could ask all
clients to use a slower, integrity-protected Verifiable DC-net
(VDC-net) [15] will be used instead of the vanilla DC-net
used in PriFi. The client then retransmit exactly the same
message over the VDC-net.
Identifying Flipped Bits. Once in possession of the two
messages x¯ and x, the relay will try to identify which party
misbehaved. For this, he will find a bit that is 0 in the original
message x, but got flipped to a 1 in x¯.
If a flipped 0-bit is found at position k, the relay will
stop the Anonymize protocol and send a signed request to
all clients and guards to reveal the individual bits from their
different pads at position k for the disrupted round. Each
client will reveal one bit per guard, and each guard will reveal
one bit per client; we write {b}Ci for the m bits revealed by
client Ci, and {b}Sj for the n bits revealed by guard Sj .
If no flipped 0-bit is found, the relay stops the disruption-
protection protocol and communications are resumed, i.e., the
attack is detected, but the disruptor cannot be traced without
breaking anonymity guarantees.
Identifying Disruptor. Once the relay receives all the bit-
revealing messages {b}C1 , ... , {b}Cn , {b}S1 , ... , {b}Sm , it
proceeds to check if a client or guard revealed values that
do not match with the value they sent in the bit position p,
i.e.,
⊕{b}Ci 6=ci at position k. In that case, the corresponding
client or guard is the disruptor and is excluded from the system.
If no mismatch is found, the relay proceeds to compare the bits
revealed by the clients against the bits revealed by the guards.
There must be a client Ci and a guard Sj such that one
of their bit mismatch (otherwise, the round would not have
been disrupted); in that case, the disruptor is either Ci or
Sj . The relay asks Ci and Sj to reveal their shared secret
rij (along with a proof showing that it has been computed
correctly), which enables to relay to recompute all pads for
all rounds, and to determine who lied. We note that revealing
rij never compromises the anonymity of a honest client, since
a honest client (transmitting a 0) and a honest guard always
have identical bits in their pads.
B. Preliminaries
Let HMAC : G(1λ) → {0,1}λ be a standard hash-based
message authentication code [41].
C. Protocol
Protocol 3 Disruption Protection — Blame Protocol
Inputs: {riR}
Output: ⊥.
1. Relay blame initiation. R receives HMAC(riR,x)||x at round t. If
the HMAC verification fails, it sets a flag in the downstream message
z indicating that the next schedule will use a VDC-net.
2. Client retransmission. Upon reception of the flag at round t, all
clients note to switch to a VDC-net at round t+n. The slot owner
Ct retransmits x over the VDC-net at round t+n.
3. Relay finds a flipped bit. The relay compares x¯ and x bit-per-bit
and finds a position k where x¯k=1 and xk=0. If there is no such
k, this protocol stops without excluding the disruptor.
The relay broadcasts Sign(PR, t||k) to all.
4. Clients/guards answer with the kth-bits of the pads. Each client
Ci answers with Sign(PCi , {b}Ci) where {b}Ci are the bits at
position k of the m pads pij ,1≤ j <m of round t. Similarly, each
guard Sj answers with Sign(PSi , {b}Sj ).
5. Relay isolates a mismatch. When all messages have been received,
R checks that for each Ci, the value
⊕
1≤j<mbCi equals the bit at
position k of ci, as it should. R performs the same check for each
Si against si. If a check fails, the corresponding client or guard is
excluded, and this protocol stops.
Then, R finds a pair (Ci, Sj) such that bCi,j 6= bSj ,i. Either Ci
or Si is lying. R sends Sign(PR,Sign(PSi ,{b}Sj )) to Ci, and
Sign(PR,Sign(PCi ,{b}Ci)) to Si.
6. Client and guard reveal their shared secret. After verifying the
two signatures, Ci checks himself for the mismatch bCi,j 6=bSj ,i found
by the R. If there is no mismatch, Ci aborts this protocol. Otherwise,
Ci answers with Sign(PCi ,rij), along with a NIZK proof that rij
was computed correctly. Si performs the same operations.
7. Relay excludes the disruptor. R checks the signatures and the
NIZK proofs. Then, R recomputes the client and guard pad for round
t using the shared secret, and excludes whoever lied.
D. Limitations
The protocol is probabilistic, and fails to identify a disruptor
iff only 1-bits were flipped to 0-bits. If this is a problem, the
client can additionally XOR a pre-agreed random mask of
length ` in the message, for instance derived from riR. The
relay removes this mask after verifying the HMAC.
VI. EQUIVOCATION PROTECTION
We discussed how the malicious relay does not perform
active attacks against availability. However, the relay can
perform activate attacks to break other properties, namely
the anonymity of the clients. In practice, a credible scenario
is a router infected with malware or compromised by the
adversary, spying on honest users on a corporate network.
In an organisational network, the relay — the gateway
to the Internet — has a powerful position. In particular, it
sees and handles packets for all clients. Potentially, those
packets are not even encrypted, as it is the responsability
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de-facto not encrypted (e.g., DNS requests). In this context,
the relay can perform a powerful attack to de-anonymize
clients: instead of broadcasting packets to all clients, the relay
send different messages to each client, and hopes that their
subsequent behavior will reveal which client actually decrypted
the broadcasted message. Informally, the relay can break
receiver-anonymity, and this is called an equivocation attack.
Equivocation example. Client C1 and C2 are both honest.
On the first round, the relay decodes an anonymous DNS
request. Instead of broadcasting the same DNS answer to C1
and C2, the relay sends two different answers to C1 and C2,
containing IP1 and IP2, respectively. Later, the relay decodes
an anonymous TCP packet with IP2 as destination. He can
guess that C2 made the request, as C1 has never received IP2.
Intuitively, to thwart an equivocation attack, clients need to
agree on what they received before transmitting anything.
In PriFi, this is achieved without adding extra latency and
without synchronization between clients. More precisely,
clients encrypt their upstream messages before anonymizing
them. This encryption depends on the downstream history of
messages, and the relay is unable to compute a plaintext if
not all clients share the same history.
A. Preliminaries
Let Fq denote a finite field of prime order q, G denote a
multiplicative group of order q with generator g such that the
DLP and the DDH assumptions hold in G [6].
Let H :{0,1}∗→{0,1}` be a cryptographic hash function,
and F1 :{0,1}`→G and F2 :{0,1}`→Fq be functions
mappings bitstrings to G and Fq, respectively. We assume
F1 and F2 are publicly-known one-to-one functions that are
efficiently computable and invertible.
B. Protocol
All clients and the relay keep track of all received
downstream messages in a downstream history h. The
downstream history is computed as the cryptographic hash of
the previous downstream history concatenated with the most
recent downstream message z, i.e., h′←H(h‖z).
In each round, the slot owner encrypts its upstream message
x with a fresh random key k, and transmits it in the DC-net
by sending a ciphertext ci computed as before. Additionally, it
sends a contribution κi corresponding to a blinded version of
the decryption key k, “bound” to its history hi. Other clients
and the guards also send contributions κi and σj respectively,
along with their usual ciphertext ci and sj .
Informally, the κi and σj are computed such as, if all
clients have the same value for the history hi, the relay is
able to recompute k, which allows him to decrypt x′ into x,
and proceed as defined before (Protocol 2).
We provide the full equivocation-protection protocol in
Protocol 4.
Protocol 4 Equivocation Protection
Inputs: Each client Ci has a message history hi, and hR for the
relay R. Initially, hi=hR=0, 1≤ i<m.
As defined in Protocol 2, x is the plaintext of the slot owner and pij
are the pads.
Output: Anonymous upstream message y.
1. History updates. Whenever receiving a downstream message z
from the relay, Ci updates his version of the history hi by computing
hi←H(hi‖z).
Similary, the relay keeps his history hR up-to-date with the down-
stream messages z he sends.
2. Guard Tag Generation. Each round, every guard Sj sends to the
relay (sj ,σj), where
sj ← p1j ⊕ ... ⊕ pnj , (1)
σj ←−
n∑
i=1
F2(H(pij))
3. Client Tag Generation.
(1) If Ci is the slot owner, it picks a pseudo-random key
k
$←{0,1}`, and blinds x with it.
x′ ← x ⊕ k (2)
Ci then computes (ci, κi) as
ci ← x′ ⊕ pi1 ⊕ ... ⊕ pim (3)
κi ← F1(k)·F1(hi)
∑m
j=1F2(H(pij))
(2) If Ci is not the slot owner, then it sets
ci←pi1⊕···⊕pim (4)
κi←F1(hi)
∑m
j=1F2(H(pij))
(3) Ci sends (ci,κi) to the relay.
4. Relay Decryption.
(1) Upon receiving (ci, κi)’s from all clients and (sj , σj)’s from
all guards, the relay computes
k←F1(h)
∑m
j=1σj ·
n∏
i=1
κi (5)
y′←c1⊕···⊕cn⊕s1⊕···⊕sm
y←y′⊕F−11 (k).
VII. EVALUATION
We implemented PriFi in Go [2]; this includes all protocols
presented in the paper with the exception of the second “blame”
mechanism (Section D) used to exclude an insider performing a
DoS against the equivocation protection, and the verifiable DC-
net mentioned in the disruption protection (Section V) since
we suggest to reuse an existing VDC-net such as Verdict [15].
We evaluate the deployment of PriFi on Deterlab [22] on a
topology representing an organizational network.
Methodology. Our evaluation is five-fold: first, we measure the
end-to-end latency via a SOCKS tunnel without data, by having
a client randomly ping the relay. Second, we compare PriFi with
the closest related work, Dissent [71]. Third, we replay network
traces (.pcap files) that correspond to various workloads on
PriFi and we measure the added latency and the bandwidth
usage. Fourth, we introduce and evaluate two scenarios: having
9a local trusted guard (which will be relevant in the case of the
ICRC) and having remote clients (not part of the LAN). Finally,
we explore the effect of churn and user mobility on PriFi.
Experimental setup. We use Deterlab as a testbed; the
topology simulated consists of a 100Mbps LAN with 10ms
latency between the relay and the clients; we run 3 guards
servers, which each have a 10Mbps link with 100ms latency
to the relay. We use 9 machines, 1 dedicated to the relay and
1 per guard server; the clients are simulated on the remaining
5 machines, distributed equally. All machines are 3GHz Xeon
Dual Core with 2GB of RAM. We focus our evaluation
between 2 and 100 users, which is inspired from the ICRC
operational sites (Appendix, Figure 9).
Reproducibility. All experiments presented in this paper are
reproducible with a few simple commands after cloning the
repository [2]. Additionally, all raw logs and scripts to recreate
the plots are available in a separate repository [3].
A. End-to-End Latency without Data
Figure 3(a) shows the latency of the PriFi system, i.e., the
time needed for an anonymized packet to be sent by the client,
decoded by the relay, and sent back to this same client. In
this experiment, one random user is responsible for measuring
these “pings”, whereas others only participate in the protocol
without sending data (i.e., the number of active user is 1,
anonymous among all users). The latency increases linearly
with the number of clients, from 42ms for 20 users (e.g., a
small company) to 120ms for 100 users, and scales reasonably
well with the number of clients.
A major component of the latency is the buffering of
messages by the clients; with only one slot per schedule, clients
must wait for this slot before transmitting data. This waiting
time is depicted by the red curve in Figure 3(a). To reduce
the time spent waiting on the slot, we alter the scheduling
mechanism and let clients “close” their slot if they have nothing
to send, thus enabling other clients to transmit more frequently.
This reservation mechanism improves the situation where many
users are idle. It introduces additional delay in some cases,
as the client needs to wait for the next reservation to open his
slot, and wait again for his slot. Other scheduling mechanisms
(e.g., a compact schedule at every message, or no schedule but
allowing for collisions) would yield different trade-offs between
latency and number of users depending on their workload.
To reduce further latency, we pipeline rounds — i.e., we
run DC-nets rounds in parallel. This divides the latency by
2.25 (Appendix, Figure 8) at the cost of higher bandwidth
usage — and higher anonymous throughput.
In this experiment, we briefly evaluate the CPU and
Memory cost in Appendix D.
B. Comparison with Related Work
The closest related work is Dissent In Number (D#) [71];
like PriFi, it provides provable traffic-analysis by using
DC-nets, has similar assumptions (M anytrust servers) but
with no particular emphasis on being low-latency. We do
not compare with mix-nets and onion-routing protocols that
have a significantly different architecture: users’ messages
are routed through multiple hops over the Internet, and even
traffic between two clients of the same LAN would have to
leave the LAN to be anonymized.
The first major difference between PriFi and D# is in
the functionality of the guards. As in PriFi, D# uses a
set of M anytrust guards, but the protocol requires several
server-to-server communications per round before outputting
any anonymized data. Additionally, the clients’ traffic is routed
through one server — selected at random in D# — which
also increases latency.
We deploy D# on our setup corresponding to an
organizational network and compare it against PriFi. For 100
users, a round-trip message takes ≈14.5 s in D# and 137ms
in PriFi, 3 orders of magnitude faster (Figure 3(b)).
C. Latency with Data
Replaying Standard Traces. We then evaluate the performance
of PriFi when replaying standard traces (.pcap files). We use
the dataset ‘apptrafictraces’ [58] from CRAWDAD [17] that
contains the traces for several applications. We selected three
sub-traces: a ‘Skype’ trace where one client performs a VoIP
(non-video) call for 281 seconds, a ‘Hangouts’ where one
client performs a video call for 720 seconds, and an ‘Others’
trace where Gmail, Facebook, WhatsApp, Dropbox and other
non-audio, non-video services run for 15 minutes.
Using the same setup as before, 5% of the clients are
randomly assigned .pcap files from a pool and, after a random
delay r ∈ [0,30] seconds, they replay the individual packets
through PriFi. The relay decodes the packets and records the
time difference between the decoded packet and the original
trace (due to the fact that most endpoints present in the traces
were not reachable anymore, the recorded latency does not
include the communication to the Internet endpoints, but only
the added latency by PriFi).
Replaying ICRC Traces. We also replay a (private) dataset
recorded at a ICRC delegation from June to July 2018. The
capture contains network-level packet headers only, correspond-
ing to all network traffic for 30 days of capture. During active
periods (corresponding to work days), the mean number of
users is 60.9, with a standard deviation of 5.8; also during
active periods, the mean bitrate of the network is of 3.1 Mbps,
with a standard deviation of 4.7 and a (single) peak at 25 Mbps
corresponding to a bulk file transfer. To evaluate PriFi with this
dataset, we first randomly select 10 1-hour periods from the
active periods (i.e., we exclude weekends and nights); we replay
those 10 sub-traces and measure the latency and bandwidth
overhead. During this hour, we simulate a varying number of
clients: First, we identify (and only simulate) local clients, iden-
tified by an IP address of the form 10.128.10.x; those clients
replay their own packets. Second, when needed, we add addi-
tional clients, representing extra idle users (which increases the
anonymity set size); those clients send no payload data. We av-
erage the results over the 10 1-hour periods and over all clients.
Analysis. Figures 4(a), 5(a), and 5(b) show the added latency
on the ‘Skype’, ‘Others’ and ‘Hangouts’ dataset, respectively;
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(a) End-to-end latency of PriFi experienced by one client. A significant
part of this latency comes from the scheduling mechanism used (red
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(b) Experimental comparison of the latency between PriFi and Dissent
in Numbers (D#), computed as the time to send and decode an
anonymous message. The baseline is the latency of the LAN (10 ms).
Fig. 3. End-to-end latency and comparison with Dissent in Numbers.
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(a) Latency increase when using PriFi. The baseline is the latency of
the LAN (10 ms).
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(b) PriFi bandwidth usage. The total bandwidth usage is the sum
of last two 2 bars (the payload is included in the LAN traffic). We
recall that in organizational networks, LANs typically have much more
bandwidth compared to the WAN setting; typically, this bandwidth is
cheap, the bottleneck lying on the gateway to the Internet.
Fig. 4. PriFi performance when 5% of the users perform a Skype call. The remaining 95% of the users are idle.
Figure 4(b) shows the bandwidth used (PriFi has similar
bandwidth usage for all three dataset). The latency increases
with the number of clients, which is due to (1) the increasing
traffic load going through PriFi, as more users send data, and
(2) to the increasing time needed to collect all clients ciphers.
In Figure 4(b), we show the bandwidth used by the system,
split in two components: the bandwidth used in the LAN, and
in the WAN. We also show the bitrate of the payload, as an
indication of the useful throughput (goodput) of the system.
We see that the LAN bandwidth usage is typically around
40 Mbps, while the WAN usage varies from 6.9 to 1.3 Mbps.
We recall that in an organizational setting, the bandwidth
of the LAN is typically 100 Mbps or 1 Gbps, and that the
bottleneck typically lies on the link towards the Internet.
In Figure 4(b), we see that the WAN bandwidth usage
decreases with the number of clients. This is a shortcoming
which indicates that PriFi spends more time waiting and less
time transmitting, due to the increased time needed to collect
ciphers from more clients. This is not desirable, as it means
that overall PriFi cannot fully utilize the available bandwidth
to offer minimal latency; this could be mitigated by increasing
the pipelining of rounds for slow clients so that all clients
answer in a timely fashion.
We learn the following: first, the mean added latency in the
case of a Skype call (with 5% active users) is below 100ms
for up to 80 clients, and below 150ms for 100 clients. The
International Telecommunication Union estimates that the
call quality starts degrading after a 150ms one-way latency
increase [62], and users start noticing a degraded quality after a
250ms one-way latency increase [65]. Hence, while the current
implementation starts to struggle with 100 clients, it supports
VoIP calls for 0–80 users. Second, the mean added latency in
the case of the ‘Others’ dataset is always below 100ms, which
seems acceptable for Web and background services; for a
rough estimate, website pages usually load in seconds. Finally,
the replay of the ‘Hangouts’ data exhibits similar behavior
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(a) 5% of users performing various HTTP(S) requests and file
downloads.
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(b) 5% of users performing a Google Hangout video call. The current
implementation struggles starting at 80 users.
Fig. 5. PriFi latency with the ‘Others’ and ‘Hangouts’ dataset. In both cases, the bandwidth usage (not shown here) is similar to the one observed in
Figure 4(b) (except for the payload). In both cases, the baseline is the latency of the LAN (10 ms).
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(a) Latency overhead when replaying the ‘ICRC’ dataset, with 100%
of users having realistic activity. This is the average over 10 1-hour
period of high activity, recorded at an ICRC delegation.
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(b) Latencies observed in the standard scenario (3 remote guards with
high-latency towards the relay), when having one trusted guard in the
LAN, and in the VPN scenario (all users are in the WAN setting, with
100 ms latency to the relay). The baseline for the VPN scenario is
200 ms, and 20 ms in the two other scenarios.
Fig. 6. PriFi’s latency overhead with the ‘ICRC’ dataset, and in various scenarios.
as the ‘Skype’ dataset; we see that the latency increases
reasonably until 70 users, but then drastically increases,
meaning that the current implementation cannot transmit the
data fast enough, and that buffering occurs at the clients.
When replaying ICRC traces (Figures 6(a)), we observe
that the added latency varies between 15 and 147 ms. This
experiment was conducted with clients having realistic
activities, corresponding to the real workload of the ICRC
network, plus additional idle clients for the range [60;100]
on the x-axis. This confirms that PriFi can handle a realistic
workload in the case of an ICRC delegation. We emphasize
that all traffic has been anonymized throught the same PriFi
network, regardless of QoS, and in practice large file transfer
(e.g., backups) would probably either be excluded from a
low-latency network, or anonymized through other means (e.g.,
PriFi set up with a lower latency, but higher throughput).
D. Different Scenarios
Local Trusted Guard. The ICRC benefits from the particular
situation of Privileges and Immunities (P&I) [20], legal agree-
ments with governments that provide a layer of defense in order
to operate in environments of armed conflicts and other situation
of violence. In practice, P&I notably grants the delegations with
inviolability of premises and assets; together with the strong
physical security deployed at their server rooms, each delega-
tion essentially has a local trusted server. Aside from the ICRC,
P&I can apply to embassies and diplomatic missions [21].
We simulate this new deployment on Deterlab, with one
guard in the LAN instead of 3 remote guards. The latency
between the relay and the unique guard is 10 ms, like the clients.
We observe that the latency experienced by clients is roughly
cut in half in this case (Figure 6(b), purple dotted curve versus
blue solid curve), with the additional benefit that the only WAN
bandwidth usage is the anonymized goodput. The baseline
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latency in this case is twice the latency of the LAN, 20 ms.
VPN. When a member of an organization is accessing the
network remotely (e.g., traveling), it can benefit from PriFi’s
protection from outside the organizational LAN; the cost is
in performance, since the relay waits upon the slowest client
to decode an anonymous message.
We simulate this new deployment by having all clients
outside the LAN; this is modeled by having the latency
between clients and relay to be 100 ms instead of 10 ms. In
this case, the baseline for latency is 200 ms. We observe that in
this scenario, end-to-end latency varies from 280 ms to 498 ms
(Figure 6(b), red solid curve versus blue solid curve); while
is likely too high to support VoIP and video-conferencing, it
might be acceptable for web-browsing.
We note that in the VPN scenario, all users are slowed
down; this can be mitigated by having two PriFi networks, one
reserved for local users, the other one accepting remote users.
Local users would participate in both networks, ensuring a
sufficiently-large anonymity set, and would communicate only
using the fastest PriFi network.
E. Client Churn
In DC-nets, churn invalidates the current communications
and leads to data re-transmissions and global downtime
where no one can communicate. Although re-transmissions are
acceptable with PriFi’s small and frequent rounds (e.g., a few
100KB of payload each 10ms), frequent churn could prevent
delay-sensitive applications (e.g., VoIP, streaming) from running
on top of PriFi. To our knowledge, our contribution here is the
first analysis of the impact of churn on DC-nets in a realistic
scenario where nodes are mobile (e.g., Wireless devices).
Dataset. To characterize node mobility, we use a standard
dataset [52] from CRAWDAD [17]. It contains four hours
of wireless traffic, recorded in a university cafeteria. Those
traces contain the Data Link layer (and show the devices’
association and disassociation requests). The dataset contains
254 occurrences of churn over 240 minutes, in which there are
222 associations (33 unique devices) and 32 disassociations
(12 unique devices). In comparison with the ICRC scenario,
this dataset is likely a pessimistic model, as node mobility
in a cafeteria is likely higher than in offices.
Dataset Analysis. Each device (dis)connection induces a
re-synchronization time of D milliseconds (for Setup +
Schedule), where D is dominated by the number of guards M
and clients N and the latency between them; a typical value
for D would be a few seconds (Appendix, Figure ??).
We analyze three strategies to handle churn:
1) The nave approach kills the communication for every
churn, and devices experience a downtime of D every
time.
2) The abrupt disconnections approach assumes devices dis-
connect abruptly, killing the communication, but connect
using a graceful approach (Setup+Schedule done in the
background, keeping the previous Anonymize protocol
running until the new set of clients is ready). Hence, dis-
TABLE I
ESTIMATION OF MOBILITY IMPACT ON DC-NET SYSTEMS, WITH RESPECT TO
THE ‘CAFE’ DATASET. IN PRIFI, THE abrupt DISCONNECTION STRATEGY IS
ENFORCEABLE BY THE RELAY.
Strategy # Interrupt. Availability [%] Max Downtime [s]
Nave 254 98.72792 1.55147
Abrupt 32 99.81778 0.82
Graceful 0 100 0
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Fig. 7. Size of the anonymity set versus time, when using PriFi in the caf
scenario. This shows among how many users a PriFi client is anonymous.
connections yield D of downtime, and connections yield
no downtime. This strategy can be enforced by the relay.
3) The graceful approach assumes no abrupt disconnections
(leaving clients wait for the others to have finished the
Setup+Schedule happening in the background). It is an
ideal scenario that cannot be guaranteed (e.g., in case of
a device running out of battery, or malicious nodes), but
we consider it a realistic scenario, especially as honest
users have incentive to cooperate to maintain a good QoS
for everyone.
We display, in Table I, three metrics for each of these
strategies: the first metric is the raw number of communication
interruptions, which directly comes from the node mobility
in the dataset. The second metric is the network availability
percentage, computed as 1−downtimetotal time . The last metric is
the maximum continuous downtime, the longest network
interruption if PriFi is used with the aforementioned dataset.
This last metric has direct impact on usability: e.g., a PriFi
user making a VoIP call might experience audio/video freezes
for the duration of the downtime.
Analysis. Using PriFi in the cafeteria scenario represented by
the dataset [52] would slightly decrease network availability,
as churn induces global downtime. Over 4h, between 0 and
32 global losses of communication occur, and the network
availability ranges between 99.82% and 100%, depending
on the disconnection types. The longest disconnection period
is 0.82s in the worst case, which might be noticeable as a
slight lag by users of time-sensitive applications (e.g., VoIP).
If we extrapolate the worst-case availability 99.82% over
10 minutes, the total expected downtime is below 1.1 second.
Anonymity Metrics. We now analyze the size of the anonymity
set with respect to time, i.e., among how many participants
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a PriFi user is anonymous at any point in time (Figure 7).
In particular, we are interested in the variations (in this case
which are due to user mobility). A high variance means
that while connected, a user risks being “less” anonymous if
unlucky (and many people disconnect suddenly); if the size
of the anonymity set drops to 1, anonymity would be lost.
In the analyzed scenario, we start by removing the uninter-
esting linear component that indicated that, over the duration
of the experiment, more people joined the cafeteria than left
it. Then, we display the difference, in percentage, between the
actual anonymity set size and the baseline tendency. We see
that size of the anonymity set does not vary more than ±8%,
and the mean number of users is 50. Hence, our estimation
for the worst-case of “anonymity loss” in that scenario is of
4 users, which is tolerable in an anonymity set of 50 users.
VIII. RELATED WORK
One way to protect against local eavesdroppers is by
tunneling the traffic through a VPN; due to their low latency,
VPNs support most network protocols. VPNs require, however,
the user to trust the VPN provider, which is often unreasonable
— it could be malicious, coerced by the adversary, or infected
by malware. Additionally, VPNs are not traffic-analysis
resistant and make no efforts to hide individual communication
volumes and timings.
Anonymous communication networks are designed to
reduce the metadata leakage associated with communications.
We can roughly divide ACNs into three categories: onion-
routing-based [33], mix-based [10], and DC-net-based [9].
Onion-routing is attractive because communication typically
does not occur in synchronous rounds. Operating at the
application-layer, Tor [23] has the largest user-base, but
does not provide traffic analysis resistance against a global
passive adversary, and many attacks are able to break its
anonymity guarantees [51, 49, 50, 67, 66]. On the network-
layer, LAP [38], Dovetail [56], and Hornet [11] provide
lower-latency communication but do not protect against
traffic-analysis. Finally, TARANET [12] uses end-to-end traffic
shaping to provide traffic-analysis resistance with low latency,
using techniques similar to circuit-switching networks. We
note that network-layer-level solutions are attractive because
they are traffic-agnostic by design, but they often require
significant changes in the Internet.
Mix-networks [10] typically operate in synchronous rounds,
where servers sequentially mix packets. Many older solutions
are not traffic-analysis resistant, e.g., Tarzan [29] on the
network layer, Mixminion,Mixaster [18], and Crowds [54] on
the application layer. More recent works typically strive to resist
traffic-analysis. Due to the Anonymity Trilemma [19], this
incurs high cost (either in latency or bandwidth), and a common
way to keep this cost under control is by having application-
specific ACN: e.g., Riposte [13], Atom [42], Riffle [43] for
microblogging/tweets, Herd [44] for VoIP, Herbivore [32]
and Aqua [45] for BitTorrent. Although we are pleased to
see progress on anonymous communications, we argue that
application-specificity hinders user adoption: Installing and
managing multiple applications for each communication type
is a high entry barrier for non-technical users.
DC-nets [9] have provable traffic-analysis resistance by
design and typically have high bandwidth and latency costs.
Dissent [14, 71] and Verdict [15] operate at the application
layer; Dissent brings DC-nets to the anytrust model with a
client/server reducing the number of keys, whereas Verdict
thwarts some active attacks with a verifiable DC-net. They are
not bound to a certain type of traffic, but their relatively high
latency — on the orders of seconds — makes them suitable
only for latency-tolerant applications, e.g., microblogging.
PriFi fits this category and focuses on low latency in the
context of organizational networks. An earlier version of PriFi
and its preliminary evaluation showed the potential of the
client/relay/server architecture to reduce latency overhead [4].
In this paper, we provide a full and improved system design
and description, a more thorough evaluation (including the
ICRC scenario, churn analysis, comparison with related work)
and disruption protection, notably. Finally, DC-nets have
been further studied with an emphasis on detecting malicious
behavior from insiders [34, 15], collisions resolutions [31, 30],
user scheduling [39] and applications to voting [63].
IX. CONCLUSION
We have presented PriFi, an anonymous communication
network that gives provable traffic-analysis resistance to its
users. PriFi exploits the characteristics of (W)LANs to provide
low-latency, traffic-agnostic communication.
PriFi uses DC-nets to provide strong anonymity, in a design
that removes costly server-to-server communications and in
which clients’ packets remain on their usual network path, thus
avoiding the latency bottleneck typically seen in other systems.
PriFi also addresses two main shortcomings of other work in
this area: First, users are protected against equivocation attack
without added latency or costly gossiping; second, disruption
attacks are detected by the relay, with little work from the
clients and no dedicated communication rounds.
Due to its perfect traffic-analysis-resistance property, PriFi
has a high-bandwidth usage; yet, most of this bandwidth usage
happens within the organizational LAN, which is typically
well-dimensioned; additionally, the traffic coming from the
Internet to the LAN — where the bandwidth bottleneck
usually lies — scales linearly with the number of guards, a
security parameter of the system.
We have implemented PriFi and evaluated its performance
on a realistic setup, mimicking the targeted ICRC deployment.
Our findings show that various workloads can be handled
by PriFi, including VoIP and video conferencing, and that
restrictions usually imposed by DC-nets in case of churn when
users are mobile are not problematic in PriFi. We are currently
collaborating with the ICRC to test PriFi in real facilities.
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APPENDIX
A. Sketch of Security Proof
Let C1... Cn be a set of clients, two of which are honest
and the rest malicious, R a relay trusted for availability, and
S1 ... Sm a collection of m guards, all but one malicious.
Without loss of generality, define S1 as the honest guard, and
C1, C2 the two honest clients. Let G be a finite group in
which the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) is hard. They
collectively run PriFi, starting with the Setup protocol:
1) Setup Phase.
In this phase, the clients C1... Cn announce themselves to
the R by sending a signed message containing an ephemeral
public key PˆCi ∈ G. R authenticates the clients against a
roster of authorized clients, and collects the ephemeral keys
PˆC1 ... PˆCn . At this stage, the relay could add some keys
(i.e., simulating additional dishonest clients) or remove keys
(corresponding to a denial-of-service towards some client).
Given the assumption on the relay being trusted for availability,
we exclude the second scenario. We further note that the
relay cannot add an ephemeral key corresponding to a honest
user without forging its signature. Hence, at this stage, the
adversary’s only capability is to simulate malicious clients.
Then, each guard Sj derive a shared secret rij using
authenticated Diffie-Hellman with each ephemeral public key
{P˜Ci} in the final schedule. Each client i can then derive
the same secret using their freshly computed private key p˜Ci
and Sj’s public key. The adversary is unable to compute a
rij between a honest client Ci and a honest guard Sj due to
the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem in G.
To derive the schedule, R then runs with S1 ... Sm a
verifiable Neff shuffle [48] with the set of signed ephemeral
keys. The shuffle ensures that there exists a permutation pi
and a scalar d such that
P˜Ci =d·PˆCpi(i)
for all 1 ≤ i < n, and such that no information is revealed
about pi or d, under the assumption of the hardness of the
discrete logarithm [48]. Once the shuffle is done, each Si
takes the role of the Verifier V as described in the Neff-shuffle
formalization, and signs the output {P˜Ci} if and only if (1)
the shuffle contains at least two keys, and (2) the shuffle has
been correctly computed, and (3) this guard’s contribution
has been correctly included in the output. Since S1 is honest,
he performs this verification correctly, and only signs if the
verification succeeds. The adversary is unable to forge a
signature for S1 without learning its private key.
Then, R collects the final set of keys {P˜Ci} and the m
signatures from the guards, and broadcast them to the clients.
At this stage, the adversary could exclude a guard from the
shuffle (and then would have one less signature, corresponding
to one guard being offline, for instance). Each client then
receives the shuffled keys and all signatures, and is able to
verify that (1) there are enough participants, and (2) one key
in {P˜Ci} corresponds to its ephemeral public key, and (3) at
least one guard that it trusts, for instance S1, has signed the
keys. If all conditions are met, the client knows its key has
been properly shuffled. If the clients deems that no trustworthy
guard has signed the shuffle, he refuses to participate, and
possibly takes administrative actions against the relay. Hence,
in the previous step, the adversary could indeed exclude a
guard, but this would be visible and checked by the client.
2) Anonymize Phase.
Once the setup is done, nodes willing to participate move
on to the Anonymize protocol. If the set of participating node
is different from the one in the Setup protocol, by construction
of the DC-net protocol, the Anonymize protocol will fail and
timeout without compromising anonymity.
We define a time-slot t, for which the slot owner is Ct. We
define by x the message transmitted by Ct.
Upstream. In this time slot, each client generates m pads.
Each pad is the output of PRG seeded with the shared secret
rij ,1≤ j <m. Similarly, each guard generates n pads, each
one seeded with seeded with a shared secret rij ,1 ≤ i < n.
Each client and guard then compute a unique ciphertext as
the XOR of all pads; except for Ct who additionally XORs
x into the ciphertext. The relay collects the n+m ciphertexts;
if no party misbehaved, the XOR of all ciphertexts equals x.
Consider our goal (G1) Anonymity. We design an experiment
where the adversary must guess the slot owner Ct who transmit-
ted a message x. The adversary controls the guards S2,...,Sm,
the clients C3, ... Cn and the relay. We assume the Setup
phase occurred correctly, as honest clients do not participate
in Anonymize without a successfully completing these phases.
Then, the Anonymize phrase starts, and the adversary observes
output from the honest parties, namely the ciphertexts c1, c2 and
s1 from C1,C2 and S1, respectively. Without loss of generality,
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let us assume that C1 is the slot owner. We have:
c1=
m⊕
j=1
p1,j ⊕ x
c2=
m⊕
j=1
p2,j
(6)
Since S1 is honest, we differentiate the pads related to this
guard from the other pads:
c1=
m⊕
j=2
p1,j ⊕ p1,1 ⊕ x
c2=
m⊕
j=2
p2,j ⊕ p2,1
(7)
Since S1, C1 and C2 are honest, the shared secrets r1,1
and r1,2 are unknown to the adversary. Consequently, since
the pads p1,1 and p2,1 are the output of a PRF keyed with the
shared secrets, they are unknown to the adversary. Therefore,
the adversary must distinguish between the two values
p1,1 ⊕ x
p2,1
(8)
All three values are l-bit binary strings. Since p1,1 is
indistinguishable from a random string, so is p1,1 ⊕ x. The
adversary must distinguish between two l-bit random binary
strings. Hence, the adversary can only guess randomly the
slot owner t, here with probability p=1/2.
We note that this protocol — a simple DC-net — provides
perfect traffic-analysis resistance: both honest parties send
exactly the same number of bits (l) and messages (1).
Timings are irrelevant since x can only be computed once all
ciphertexts are collected, irrespective of their order. Delaying
or dropping packets do not affect anonymity.
Downstream. Once x has been computed, the relay will send
a downstream message y, encrypted with the ephemeral key
of the sender. This key has been stored when the upstream
message creating the connection was first computed. The relay
does not know to which client it belongs. Since all clients
receive the same message, the protocol has receiver-anonymity.
We address the case where not all clients receive the same
message in Section VI.
B. Sketch of Security Proof — Disruption
We are interested in two security properties: (1) the
anonymity of honest client is never compromised, and (2)
a honest client is never excluded. We do not prove that a
disruptor is indeed excluded, as it follows from the protocol.
For our first property, we examine the information revealed
by the honest parties. In step 4, clients and guards answer
with the bits of their pads. Since the pads are the output of
PRG(rij), this leaks no information about rij . Additionally,
each bit in itself is random-looking and does not leak
information. Finally, the sum of all values reveal nothing, as it
XORs to 0 by design of the DC-net (and because R chose a
0-bit swapped to 1). Then, in step 6, a client and guard reveal
their shared secret, but only if they themselves checked that
the other entity is lying. Hence, Ci reveals rij only if it was
provided with a signed message showing that Sj is cheating.
In this case, revealing rij is harmless as it was already known
to the adversary via the malicious Sj . Therefore, honest
parties do not reveal information not already known to the
adversary or that can be used to de-anonymize them.
For the second property, a honest client is trivially never
excluded because he participates faithfully in the protocol and
is never “caught lying”.
C. Sketch of Security Proof
Let C1 be the slot owner, x be its plaintext upstream
message, x′ be its encrypted upstream message, and k be the
key used to encrypt x into x′.
We first consider the case that all clients have received the
same downstream messages from the relay until the current slot,
i.e., h1=h2= ···=hn=h. By substituting equations (3)-(1)
in Equation (5), and letting P =
∑∑
i,jF2(pij), we have
F1(k) · F1(h)−P · F1(h)P = F1(k). Thus, the relay can
correctly unblind κo = F1−1(k) and decrypt x. Note that
although the relay learns k, due to the hardness of DLP, it
cannot learn any information about clients’ pads
∑m
j=1F2(pij),
which could otherwise be used to de-anonymize clients.
Now, consider two disjoint non-empty subsets
A,B⊂{1,...,n}, such that all clients Ci∈A have the
downstream history hA and all clients Ci∈B have the
downstream history hB 6=hA. From Equation 5,
k′=F1(k)·F1(h)−P
·
∏
i∈A
F1(hA)
∑m
j=1F2(pij) (9)
·
∏
i∈B
F1(hB)
∑m
j=1F2(pij) (10)
Since F1(h)
−P
=
∏n
i=1F1(h)
−∑mj=1F2(pij), and A,B are
disjoint non-empty subsets of {1,...,n}, for any choice of h
in Equation (10), k′ 6=F1(k). In this case, the relay is unable
to decrypt x′.
D. Abusing the Equivocation Protection
False accusations. A malicious client or relay might try to
falsely accuse the other: e.g., to frame the relay, a malicious
client might pretend to have received a downstream message
different from other clients. Reciprocally, a malicious relay
can pretend that an honest client is sending wrongly-computed
κi to cause a DoS. These problems are solved by requiring
that clients and guards sign every message they send.
Active DoS. A malicious client or guard can perform a DoS
by sending arbitrary values instead of the κi and σj defined.
Here, signing does not help, as the relay is unable to validate
the correctness of κi and σj .
However, the relay can detect such attack (if it sees an
invalid the HMAC, but after running Protocol 3, finds that
x has not been altered). Then, it uses a blame mechanism
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similar to the Disruption protection (but simpler): the relay
asks clients and guards to reveal the values H(pij) used in
the computation of κi and σj . Since H is a cryptographic
hash function (i.e., with preimage resistance), this does not
allow an adversary to retrieve information about the pads
pij , while enabling the relay to check for the κi and σj . If
all values were correctly computed, as before, there must
be a mismatch between the pads revealed between a pair of
client/guard. The relay asks them to prove their shared secret
and the computation that led to it, as in Protocol 3.
To support different QoS levels, PriFi enables clients to
subscribe to channels with different bitrates. Each channel
is an isolated instance of the PriFi protocol, but runs with
different speeds and payload sizes. In this way, constrained
devices (e.g., suitable IoT devices, battery-powered devices)
only join “slow” PriFi channels that require little computation,
and more powerful devices join both slower and faster
channels. Channels correspond to categories of traffic, for
instance e-mails, web browsing, VoIP and video conferencing.
With this approach, a device that has no VoIP capabilities can
save resources by joining only the appropriate channel.
Devices connected to several channels participate in
the anonymity set of those channels, but probably only
communicate using the fastest. The benefit of this approach is
that the size of the anonymity set increases for slower channels.
The cost of being active in several channels is estimated as
follow: assuming an order of magnitude difference in terms
of latency between channels (e.g., web browsing at 500ms,
VoIP at 50ms latency), joining an additional slower channel
only adds 1 message every 10 messages on the fast channel,
a tolerable cost for high-end devices.
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Fig. 8. Effect of pipelining on latency. A window W =7 divides the
latency by 2.25 in comparison to the nave W =1 approach.
CPU/Memory. We evaluated the CPU usage on the relay
during an Anonymize round; our model estimates less than
10% of average usage for 100 clients on commodity hardware
(Figure 11). We tested the memory and CPU usage on an
Android Nexus 5X device; the device on which the measure-
ments are done is doing light web browsing activities through
PriFi. During Anonymize, the mean CPU usage is light (below
5%), and the memory usage is moderate (stable at 50 Mb; for
comparison, Telegram uses 150 Mb). The energy consumption
fluctuates between “Light” and “Medium” (estimated with
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Fig. 9. Distribution of users per ICRC site. 90% of sites have less
than 100 users.
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Fig. 10. Duration of the blame procedure used to exclude a malicious
client performing a disruption attack. Dissent’s non-probabilistic
version needs “minutes to hours” to exclude a disruptor [71] (with
probability 1, unlike our protocol which has probability 1 to detect
but only 1/2 to exclude).
Android Studio 3.2 Beta) and is comparable to a VoIP
call. The iOS/Android implementations are currently being
evaluated in a real-world scenario with a large organization.
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Fig. 11. CPU usage on the relay during Anonymize, averaged over
10 minutes. The client are real Android and iOS devices (hence the
x axis stopping at 20). The relay’s hardware is a commodity server
with a 3GHz Xeon Dual Core and 2GB of RAM. If we extrapolate
the linear tendency, we estimate the mean CPU usage to be below
10% with 100 clients in this setup.
